This story
was taken from Bulatlat, the Philippines's alternative weekly
newsmagazine (www.bulatlat.com, www.bulatlat.net, www.bulatlat.org).
Vol. VII, No. 4, Feb. 25-March 3, 2007
Melo Commission
Ignored Key Policy Issues on Killings
The Melo report may have been
designed as a win-win solution for the Arroyo administration. It assuaged public
outrage over the killings by tagging a small group of military men along with
the notorious Gen. Palparan as responsible for the crimes. At the same time, it
shielded Arroyo and her cabinet from any responsibility arising from government
policies.
By Renato M. Reyes,
Jr.
The reason why the Melo Commission report came
up short with its findings lies not so much with the refusal of activist groups
to testify but with the short-sighted and questionable approach it took in
addressing the root causes of the extrajudicial killings. Thus, while the report
appears to satisfy public outrage over the killings by pointing to the
involvement of some military personnel, the report cannot be used as a framework
to solve the root causes of the killings.
The Melo Commission concluded that “there is no
official or sanctioned policy on the part of the military or civilian
superiors…to resort to illegal liquidations.” This conclusion was based mainly
on the testimonies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon. The Commission further concluded, despite what it described
as the deplorable non-participation of victims, that the killings were done by a
small group within the military. The Melo report tagged Gen. Jovito Palparan as
responsible for the killings based on the principle of command responsibility.
Understanding the existence of state policies
does not depend on the number of rights victims testifying before the
commission. An honest-to-goodness independent probe would have taken note of all
the pronouncements and issuances made by the administration as the starting
point in the investigations of policies.
The
Melo Commission did not probe the existence and operationalization of Oplan
Bantay Laya, the counter-insurgency program instituted under the Arroyo
regime. Despite the AFP’s admission that such a plan existed, the Melo
Commission did not even subpoena the Oplan and subject it to analysis.
Activists have repeatedly called attention to Oplan Bantay Laya as the
framework that has given rise to the killings. This is a crucial policy issue
that the Melo Commission failed to address.
The Melo Commission completely ignored the policy pronouncements of the
President, ranking cabinet officials and the top brass of the AFP with regards
to activist groups. The labeling of legal activist groups as “communist
fronts” has been done by the President herself, her Executive Secretary,
Justice Secretary, National Security Adviser and the leadership of both the
AFP and the PNP. The labeling has opened legal organizations to attacks by the
military. When all these top officials are consistent in labeling legal
activists as communists, it is clear that there is a policy to vilify and
subject these organizations to murderous attacks.
The
Melo Commission, while invoking command responsibility as the basis for
holding Palparan responsible, seemed to completely forget that is was Mrs.
Arroyo herself, the commander-in-chief, who publicly praised and inspired
Palapran during her State of the Nation address. Does this not constitute an
“official endorsement” of the actions of Palapran from the country’s highest
official? If Palparan can be held responsible for the killings when he
inspired people to kill activists, shouldn’t the same apply to Arroyo
inspiring Palapran?
The
Melo Commission did not investigate any policy-making body such as the Cabinet
Oversight Committee on Internal Security (COCIS). This is arguably the most
powerful cabinet cluster that formulated policies such as Proclamation 1017,
the calibrated preemptive response and the all-out war policy of the
administration. It is composed of the Executive Secretary, Justice Secretary,
Defense Secretary, DILG Secretary and the National Security Adviser. From the
onset, the Melo Commission did not think it necessary to even invite the
civilian superiors of the military. Thus, the conclusion of the Melo report
that there is no national policy coming from civilian superiors of the
military is presumptuous to say the least.
The
Melo report included gratuitous statements such as “Fortunately, the
President, as usual, was on top of the situation” and “the president’s
creation of the independent commission is testimony to her commitment to
unearth the etiology of these killings.” Such remarks are uncalled for from a
commission that claims to be independent. With statements like these, is it
any wonder why the Melo Commission never bothered to question the policy
makers over the issue of political killings? These remarks betray the
limitations of the Commission. The Melo report may have
been designed as a win-win solution for the Arroyo administration. It assuaged
public outrage over the killings by tagging a small group of military men along
with the notorious Gen. Palparan as responsible for the crimes. At the same
time, it shielded Arroyo and her cabinet from any responsibility arising from
government policies. While we welcome the
findings that the military is involved in the killings, the Melo report cannot
stand as the framework for solving the problem of political killings. Posted
by Bulatlat © 2007 Bulatlat
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