Melo Commission Ignored Key Policy Issues on Killings

The Melo report may have been designed as a win-win solution for the Arroyo administration. It assuaged public outrage over the killings by tagging a small group of military men along with the notorious Gen. Palparan as responsible for the crimes. At the same time, it shielded Arroyo and her cabinet from any responsibility arising from government policies.

By Renato M. Reyes, Jr.
Posted by Bulatlat 

The reason why the Melo Commission report came up short with its findings lies not so much with the refusal of activist groups to testify but with the short-sighted and questionable approach it took in addressing the root causes of the extrajudicial killings. Thus, while the report appears to satisfy public outrage over the killings by pointing to the involvement of some military personnel, the report cannot be used as a framework to solve the root causes of the killings.

The Melo Commission concluded that “there is no official or sanctioned policy on the part of the military or civilian superiors…to resort to illegal liquidations.” This conclusion was based mainly on the testimonies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon. The Commission further concluded, despite what it described as the deplorable non-participation of victims, that the killings were done by a small group within the military. The Melo report tagged Gen. Jovito Palparan as responsible for the killings based on the principle of command responsibility.

Understanding the existence of state policies does not depend on the number of rights victims testifying before the commission. An honest-to-goodness independent probe would have taken note of all the pronouncements and issuances made by the administration as the starting point in the investigations of policies.

1. The Melo Commission did not probe the existence and operationalization of Oplan Bantay Laya, the counter-insurgency program instituted under the Arroyo regime. Despite the AFP’s admission that such a plan existed, the Melo Commission did not even subpoena the Oplan and subject it to analysis. Activists have repeatedly called attention to Oplan Bantay Laya as the framework that has given rise to the killings. This is a crucial policy issue that the Melo Commission failed to address.

2.  The Melo Commission completely ignored the policy pronouncements of the President, ranking cabinet officials and the top brass of the AFP with regards to activist groups. The labeling of legal activist groups as “communist fronts” has been done by the President herself, her Executive Secretary, Justice Secretary, National Security Adviser and the leadership of both the AFP and the PNP. The labeling has opened legal organizations to attacks by the military. When all these top officials are consistent in labeling legal activists as communists, it is clear that there is a policy to vilify and subject these organizations to murderous attacks.

3. The Melo Commission, while invoking command responsibility as the basis for holding Palparan responsible, seemed to completely forget that is was Mrs. Arroyo herself, the commander-in-chief, who publicly praised and inspired Palapran during her State of the Nation address. Does this not constitute an “official endorsement” of the actions of Palapran from the country’s highest official? If Palparan can be held responsible for the killings when he inspired people to kill activists, shouldn’t the same apply to Arroyo inspiring Palapran?

4. The Melo Commission did not investigate any policy-making body such as the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security (COCIS). This is arguably the most powerful cabinet cluster that formulated policies such as Proclamation 1017, the calibrated preemptive response and the all-out war policy of the administration. It is composed of the Executive Secretary, Justice Secretary, Defense Secretary, DILG Secretary and the National Security Adviser. From the onset, the Melo Commission did not think it necessary to even invite the civilian superiors of the military. Thus, the conclusion of the Melo report that there is no national policy coming from civilian superiors of the military is presumptuous to say the least.

5. The Melo report included gratuitous statements such as “Fortunately, the President, as usual, was on top of the situation” and “the president’s creation of the independent commission is testimony to her commitment to unearth the etiology of these killings.” Such remarks are uncalled for from a commission that claims to be independent. With statements like these, is it any wonder why the Melo Commission never bothered to question the policy makers over the issue of political killings? These remarks betray the limitations of the Commission.

The Melo report may have been designed as a win-win solution for the Arroyo administration. It assuaged public outrage over the killings by tagging a small group of military men along with the notorious Gen. Palparan as responsible for the crimes. At the same time, it shielded Arroyo and her cabinet from any responsibility arising from government policies.  

While we welcome the findings that the military is involved in the killings, the Melo report cannot stand as the framework for solving the problem of political killings. Posted by Bulatlat

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