How Much Power Will
the New Iraqi Government Really Have?
By Stephen
Zunes
CommonDreams.org
There has been much
attention given in the run-up to this Sunday’s elections in Iraq regarding
how the lack of security in much of the country, combined with the
decision by major Sunni Arab parties to boycott in protest of recent U.S.
attacks on several major urban areas, could thereby skew the results and
compromise the resulting government’s credibility. Related concerns
include the prospect of this election and the government which emerges
exacerbating the divisions between Shiite Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds.
Perhaps an even
bigger question is what kind of power this new government will actually
have.
While some Iraqis are
cautiously optimistic that the election of a national assembly could bring
about real improvements to their lives, they could find themselves very
disappointed.
It would not be the
first time. Indeed, most Iraqis appear to have initially been willing to
give the transitional government established this past June a chance, just
as they were in the early days of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), the
advisory body appointed by U.S. occupation authorities soon after the
March 2003 U.S. invasion. In both cases, however, it soon became apparent
that neither of these bodies had much real power. Furthermore, both were
dominated by recently-returned exiles who seemed to be more concerned with
their personal ambitions than the best interests of the nation.
To simply declare
that American forces in Iraq are no longer an occupation army but are
there at the request of a sovereign Iraqi government has not been enough
to assuage most Iraqis. The majority of Afghans in the 1980s and South
Vietnamese in the 1960s never saw the regimes in
Kabul
and Saigon as legitimate. These unpopular dictatorships came to power and
maintained their control only as result of superpower intervention. The
foreign forces directed from Moscow and Washington were seen by the
majority of the subjected populations as occupation armies and, despite
enormous advantages in firepower, were eventually forced out. And, despite
continued infusions of large-scale military assistance to these regimes,
both were overthrown within just a few years of their patrons’ departures.
Similarly, despite
last June’s formal handover to a transitional government, American forces
and the dwindling number of Coalition allies are still seen by the vast
majority of Iraqis as occupiers. Polls show that a sizeable majority of
Iraqis want U.S. forces out. The ongoing American military presence, and
particularly recent U.S. offensives in Fallujah and elsewhere, has been
provoking insurgents and terrorists faster than they can be killed. In
order to be seen as having any real legitimacy in the longer term,
whatever Iraqi government comes to power following Sunday’s election will
need to assert its independence from
U.S.
control.
It also remains to be
seen as to whether the United
States will allow the new
government likely to be dominated by Shiite parties with a strong Islamist
and nationalist agenda to assert their authority. Will the United States
really defend freedom and democratic rule in Iraq if it results in a
government that pursues policies seen to be contrary to American strategic
and economic interests? Or like Saddam’s non-existent weapons of mass
destruction and the absence of any operational, financial, or logistical
links to Al-Qaeda will “the establishment of democracy in
Iraq”
prove to be yet another deception of the American public in order to
justify the U.S. takeover of that
oil-rich nation?
The “Transitional
Government”
The decision this
past June by U.S. occupation authorities to formally transfer power to
Iraqis two days early likely stemmed from security concerns, wanting to
deny terrorists an opportunity for a dramatic strike. In many respects,
however, it was emblematic of how little real change the handover meant in
actuality. In any case, a small, short, hurried, and unannounced ceremony
was hardly an auspicious beginning of Iraqi self-rule.
(The transition
ceremony was eerily reminiscent of the 1985 inauguration ceremony of
Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos following his fraudulent re-election,
which took place inside his residence at a point when he had essentially
lost control of virtually the entire country beyond the palace walls. As
White House spokesperson Larry Speakes, when asked by reporters about the
ceremony, replied, “I understand it’s going to be a low-key affair.”)
Originally, the June
“transfer” was planned to be a grand public event, with parades and
speeches, highlighted by President Bush already in neighboring Turkey at
the conclusion of the NATO summit coming down to join the festivities to
formally hand over power. Instead, President Bush was informed of the
handover in a hand-written note from his National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice, to which the president scribbled his now famous
response, “Let freedom reign!,” an oxymoron which is in many ways
represents the contradictions inherent in any effort to forcefully impose
a liberal democratic system through conquest and subjugation.
The establishment of
the new government following Sunday’s election will be taking place in an
even more dire security situation.
The transitional
Iraqi government has not had the power to overturn many of the edicts of
the former American viceroy Paul Bremer and his Iraqi appointees in the
IGC, and was therefore unable to chart an independent course. Even in
cases where the transitional government technically could have overturned
U.S.-imposed laws, it required a consensus of the president, prime
minister, vice premiers and other government officials, so not
surprisingly virtually all these laws have remained in effect.
These include such
important decisions as the privatization of public enterprises, the
allowance for 100% repatriation of profits by foreign corporations, a flat
tax of 15%, the right of foreigners to own up to 100% of Iraqi companies,
and other neo-liberal economic measures. While there is little question
that at least some liberalization of the economy, after years of state
control under Saddam’s dictatorship, is necessary for the country’s
economic health, Iraqis resent such important economic issues being
decided by an occupying power which clearly has a strong vested economic
interest in their country.
Nor has the
transitional government had the power to prosecute any Americans for
crimes committed while in Iraq, no matter how serious. Iraqis have found
such legal extraterritoriality, a practice once common in colonial
outposts of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, particularly
degrading.
Nor has the
transitional government been able to exercise much authority when it comes
to security, since U.S. forces have been able to operate throughout the
country at will, and the “sovereign” Iraqi government has had no right to
limit their activities. Secretary of State Colin Powell claimed that U.S.
forces and their sprawling bases throughout Iraq which are being expanded
in ways which appear to indicate an intention to stay for the long term
were no different than U.S. bases in Germany or South Korea. However,
unlike Iraq, the United States does not have a right to bomb German or
South Korean cities without permission of their governments.
Similarly, the U.S.
ambassador John Negroponte, has not been as the Bush Administration has
claimed “just like any other ambassador,” give that many of the more than
1500 Americans attached to his “embassy” hold prominent positions
throughout virtually every Iraqi ministry and his office controls much of
the Iraqi government’s budget. (Negroponte has had some practice for this
sort of thing: He was widely considered to be at least the second most
powerful man in Honduras when he was U.S. ambassador in Tegucigalpa in the
1980s, given the large numbers of American troops in the country and the
dependence of the regime on U.S. military and economic support.)
Until the Iraqi
government has full control over military and security affairs within its
borders and authority over its economic and social policy, Iraq remains an
occupied country. There cannot be limited sovereignty any more than one
can be a little bit pregnant.
Despite the reluctant
stamp of approval by the UN special envoy and the UN Security Council of
the transitional government, the fact remains that the president, prime
minister, and virtually all other major positions in the interim Iraqi
government were filled by members of the IGC, which was appointed by U.S.
occupation authorities.
The most important
and influential figure in the government has been Ayad Allawi. Prior to
his appointment as prime minister, polls of Iraqis showed that Allawi’s
popularity ranked quite low in terms of personal support. His earlier
career as a Baathist, which included active support for political
repression, combined with his later years in exile with ties to the CIA
and anti-government terrorist groups, has raised concerns regarding his
commitment to democracy and human rights. He has proven to be an unpopular
leader, particular as a result of his autocratic governing style and his
support for offensive military actions by U.S. and Iraqi government forces
which have resulted in large-scale civilian casualties.
President Ghazi al-Yawar
was initially viewed suspiciously by many Iraqis because of his Saudi
ties, his many years in exile, and his membership in the IGC, though he
has since gained some credibility for his criticism of U.S.
counter-insurgency tactics. He wields very little power, however, even
compared with the prime minister.
Just as the Soviet
Red Army, which had freed eastern European nations from Nazi occupation at
the end of World War II only to forcibly impose a Soviet-style political
and economic system and foreign policy priorities onto compliant
governments of their own creation, the United States is seen by increasing
numbers of Iraqis as having similarly imposed its own priorities onto
Iraq. The Eastern Europeans eventually won their freedom largely through
protracted, nonviolent struggles to create democratic systems. The Iraqis,
however, are already in open rebellion, they are utilizing guerrilla
warfare and terrorism, and much of the organized resistance does not seek
a particularly democratic society as the final outcome.
Tragically, the
longer the United States is seen as an occupier, the credibility of
pro-democratic political figures will decline and support for more
extremist elements will grow.
After the
elections
How much power the
national assembly will be able to wield is in question. The Transitional
Administrative Law, which was imposed by U.S. occupation authorities,
remains the law of the land in Iraq. Amendments can only be passed with a
three-quarters majority of the National Assembly as well as the unanimous
support of the Presidential Council. Due to their advantages in
organization and funding, parties dominated by pro-American exiles could
easily get at least 25% of the vote and/or at least one member of the
Presidential Council, thereby leaving these unpopular laws in place.
Members of the “control commissions” including those overseeing the media
and public finances are dominated by American appointees and are scheduled
to serve until at least 2009. American appointees also dominate the
judiciary, which can challenge government rulings.
Furthermore, given
the current level of the insurgency and the inadequacies of the Iraqi
army, the government’s very survival may depend on ongoing cooperation
with American prerogatives.
Even if the United
States allows the new Iraqi government to assert their authority, however,
it will still face serious problems with its credibility.
Perhaps most
important is the restoration of basic services. Everyone from the General
Accounting Office to various development agencies has underscored the fact
that Iraqis are worse off now than they were prior to the U.S. invasion.
In contrast to the
1991 Gulf War, where despite severe economic sanctions and heavier bombing
damage inflicted upon the Iraqi infrastructure than in the 2003 invasion
the Iraqi government was able to restore electrical power and most other
basic services on its own within months, large areas of Iraq still lack
electrical power and basic services nearly three years after the war.
While sabotage by anti-occupation forces has certainly made reconstruction
difficult, there are also widespread charges of incompetence and
corruption by U.S. contractors, who have shown a clear preference for
bringing in skilled workers from the United States and elsewhere despite
the presence of large numbers of qualified Iraqis desperately in need for
employment.
Whatever the reason,
the ability of the new government to rebuild the infrastructure and
restore basic services is far more important to most Iraqis than its
ideological orientation or ethnic makeup. The big question is whether the
United States will forgo the bonanza offered to American contractors under
the present arrangement in order to allow the new Iraqi government a
chance to prove itself capable of providing basic services and tackling
the country’s debilitating high rate of unemployment.
A second big test of
the government will be in its ability to halt the violence, both the
widespread street crime (such as armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, and
murder) which has dramatically worsened since the U.S. invasion as well as
the violent insurgency against the U.S. occupation and its supporters.
Though the use of terrorism by some elements of the resistance is not
winning them converts, most Iraqis still end up blaming the United States,
since it was the U.S. forces that ousted the government and dismantled its
security apparatus which, despite its extreme brutality, was able to
maintain a stability and order.
A related challenge
to the new government would be the temptation of radicals, particularly
outsiders, to continue to engage in provocative actions designed in part
to trigger counter-measures by U.S. or Iraqi government forces that
inevitably result in still more civilian casualties and thereby further
alienate the population from the United States and its Iraqi surrogates.
Also problematic are
the conflicting desires of the Kurds, the Shiite Arabs, and the
traditionally dominant Sunni Arabs, in governing the country. Though
concerns over Kurdish rights and calls for some kind of federal system are
quite reasonable in themselves, most Iraqis see this as an effort by the
United States to divide and rule. The Shiite majority, meanwhile having
been systematically denied power by the Ottoman, British, Hashemite and
Baathist rulers are understandably disappointed that on the verge of
finally being able to become the dominant political force, they are
suddenly being told they must defer to the interests of the minority Kurds
and Sunnis. (An appropriate analogy might be an American city where, just
as African-Americans are finally poised to constitute an electoral
majority, the city charter is revised that devolves power away from City
Hall or changes the election of the city council from city-wide to
district elections.)
Even if one was to
assume the best of intentions by the Bush administration, the United
States has so alienated the Iraqi people that virtually everything
Americans do in Iraq is now seen through skeptical eyes. Therefore, the
more the United States can refrain from limiting the power of the new
government or influencing its political direction, the more successful it
is likely to be.
It is possible that
the ascension of an elected national assembly and the writing of a
constitution could indeed mark the beginnings of the establishment of a
more stable, prosperous and pluralistic
Iraq.
However, it would require putting into practice far more enlightened and
deferential policies towards the new government in
Baghdad than the Bush Administration has
thus far shown itself willing to implement.
What the Bush
Administration and most members of Congress of both parties fail to
acknowledge is that Iraq cannot be pro-American without being at least
somewhat autocratic and it cannot be democratic without being at least
somewhat anti-American. The United States can have an Iraq that serves as
a key strategic ally and close economic partner or it can have an Iraq
with a legitimate representative government. Unless there is a radical
change in U.S. policy, it cannot have both.
Stephen Zunes is a
professor of Politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at
the University of San Francisco. He is Middle East editor for the Foreign
Policy in Focus project and the author of Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East
Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Common Courage Press, 2003.)
Jan. 28, 2005
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