The President's Real Goal In Iraq
BY JAY BOOKMAN
29 September 2002
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greater depth. The official story on Iraq has never made sense. The
connection that the Bush administration has tried to draw between Iraq and
al-Qaida has always seemed contrived and artificial. In fact, it was hard
to believe that smart people in the Bush administration would start a
major war based on such flimsy evidence.
The pieces just
didn't fit. Something else had to be going on; something was missing.
In recent days, those
missing pieces have finally begun to fall into place. As it turns out,
this is not really about Iraq. It is not about weapons of mass
destruction, or terrorism, or Saddam, or U.N. resolutions.
This war, should it
come, is intended to mark the official emergence of the United States as a
full-fledged global empire, seizing sole responsibility and authority as
planetary policeman. It would be the culmination of a plan 10 years or
more in the making, carried out by those who believe the United States
must seize the opportunity for global domination, even if it means
becoming the "American imperialists" that our enemies always claimed we
were.
Once that is
understood, other mysteries solve themselves. For example, why does the
administration seem unconcerned about an exit strategy from Iraq once
Saddam is toppled?
Because we won't be
leaving. Having conquered Iraq,
the United States
will create permanent military bases in that country from which to
dominate the Middle East, including neighboring Iran.
In an interview
Friday, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld brushed aside that suggestion,
noting that the United States does not covet other nations' territory.
That may be true, but 57 years after World War II ended, we still have
major bases in Germany and Japan. We will do the same in Iraq.
And why has the
administration dismissed the option of containing and deterring Iraq, as
we had the Soviet Union for 45 years? Because even if it worked,
containment and deterrence would not allow the expansion of American
power. Besides, they are beneath us as an empire. Rome did not stoop to
containment; it conquered. And so should we.
Among the architects
of this would-be American Empire are a group of brilliant and powerful
people who now hold key positions in the Bush administration: They
envision the creation and enforcement of what they call a worldwide "Pax
Americana," or American peace. But so far, the American people have not
appreciated the true extent of that ambition.
Part of it's laid out
in the National Security Strategy, a document in which each administration
outlines its approach to defending the country. The Bush administration
plan, released Sept. 20, marks a significant departure from previous
approaches, a change that it attributes largely to the attacks of Sept.
11.
To address the
terrorism threat, the president's report lays out a newly aggressive
military and foreign policy, embracing pre-emptive attack against
perceived enemies. It speaks in blunt terms of what it calls "American
internationalism," of ignoring international opinion if that suits U.S.
interests. "The best defense is a good offense," the document asserts.
It dismisses
deterrence as a Cold War relic and instead talks of "convincing or
compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities."
In essence, it lays
out a plan for permanent U.S. military and economic domination of every
region on the globe, unfettered by international treaty or concern. And to
make that plan a reality, it envisions a stark expansion of our global
military presence.
"The United States
will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and
Northeast Asia," the document warns, "as well as temporary access
arrangements for the long-distance deployment of
U.S.
troops."
The report's repeated
references to terrorism are misleading, however, because the approach of
the new National Security Strategy was clearly not inspired by the events
of Sept. 11. They can be found in much the same language in a report
issued in September 2000 by the Project for the New American Century, a
group of conservative interventionists outraged by the thought that the
United States might be forfeiting its chance at a global empire.
"At no time in
history has the international security order been as conducive to American
interests and ideals," the report said. stated two years ago. "The
challenge of this coming century is to preserve and enhance this 'American
peace.' "
Familiar themes
Overall, that 2000
report reads like a blueprint for current Bush defense policy. Most of
what it advocates, the Bush administration has tried to accomplish. For
example, the project report urged the repudiation of the anti-ballistic
missile treaty and a commitment to a global missile defense system. The
administration has taken that course.
It recommended that
to project sufficient power worldwide to enforce Pax Americana, the United
States would have to increase defense spending from 3 percent of gross
domestic product to as much as 3.8 percent. For next year, the Bush
administration has requested a defense budget of $379 billion, almost
exactly 3.8 percent of GDP.
It advocates the
"transformation" of the U.S. military to meet its expanded obligations,
including the cancellation of such outmoded defense programs as the
Crusader artillery system. That's exactly the message being preached by
Rumsfeld and others.
It urges the
development of small nuclear warheads "required in targeting the very
deep, underground hardened bunkers that are being built by many of our
potential adversaries." This year the GOP-led U.S. House gave the Pentagon
the green light to develop such a weapon, called the Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator, while the Senate has so far balked.
That close tracking
of recommendation with current policy is hardly surprising, given the
current positions of the people who contributed to the 2000 report.
Paul Wolfowitz is now
deputy defense secretary. John Bolton is undersecretary of state. Stephen
Cambone is
head of the
Pentagon's Office of Program, Analysis and Evaluation. Eliot Cohen and
Devon Cross are members of
the Defense Policy
Board, which advises Rumsfeld. I. Lewis Libby is chief of staff to Vice
President Dick Cheney. Dov Zakheim is comptroller for the Defense
Department.
'Constabulary duties'
Because they were
still just private citizens in 2000, the authors of the project report
could be more frank and less diplomatic than they were in drafting the
National Security Strategy. Back in 2000, they clearly identified Iran,
Iraq and North Korea as primary short-term targets, well before President
Bush tagged them as the Axis of Evil. In their report, they criticize the
fact that in war planning against North Korea and Iraq, "past Pentagon
wargames have given little or no consideration to the force requirements
necessary not only to defeat an attack but to remove these regimes from
power."
To preserve the Pax
Americana, the report says U.S. forces will be required to perform
"constabulary duties" -- the United States acting as policeman of the
world -- and says that such actions "demand American political leadership
rather than that of the United Nations."
To meet those
responsibilities, and to ensure that no country dares to challenge the
United States, the report advocates a much larger military presence spread
over more of the globe, in addition to the roughly 130 nations in which
U.S. troops are already deployed.
More specifically,
they argue that we need permanent military bases in the Middle East,
in Southeast Europe, in Latin
America and in Southeast Asia, where no such bases now exist. That helps
to explain another of the mysteries of our post-Sept. 11 reaction, in
which the Bush administration rushed to install U.S. troops in Georgia and
the Philippines, as well as our eagerness to send military advisers to
assist in the civil war in Colombia.
The 2000 report
directly acknowledges its debt to a still earlier document, drafted in
1992 by the Defense Department. That document had also envisioned the
United States as a colossus astride the world, imposing its will and
keeping world peace through military and economic power. When leaked in
final draft form, however, the proposal drew so much criticism that it was
hastily withdrawn and repudiated by the first President Bush.
Effect on allies
The defense secretary
in 1992 was Richard Cheney; the document was drafted by Wolfowitz, who at
the time was defense undersecretary for policy.
The potential
implications of a Pax Americana are immense.
One is the effect on
our allies. Once we assert the unilateral right to act as the world's
policeman, our allies will quickly recede into the background. Eventually,
we will be forced to spend American wealth and American blood protecting
the peace while other nations redirect their wealth to such things as
health care for their citizenry.
Donald Kagan, a
professor of classical Greek history at Yale and an influential advocate
of a more aggressive foreign policy -- he served as co-chairman of the
2000 New Century project -- acknowledges that likelihood.
"If [our allies] want
a free ride, and they probably will, we can't stop that," he says. But he
also argues that the United States, given its unique position, has no
choice but to act anyway.
"You saw the movie
'High Noon'? he asks. "We're Gary Cooper."
Accepting the Cooper
role would be an historic change in who we are as a nation, and in how we
operate in the international arena. Candidate Bush certainly did not
campaign on such a change. It is not something that he or others have
dared to discuss honestly with the American people. To the contrary, in
his foreign policy debate with Al Gore, Bush pointedly advocated a more
humble foreign policy, a position calculated to appeal to voters leery of
military intervention.
For the same reason,
Kagan and others shy away from terms such as empire, understanding its
connotations. But they also argue that it would be naive and dangerous to
reject the role that history has thrust upon us. Kagan, for example,
willingly embraces the idea that the United States would establish
permanent military bases in a post-war Iraq.
"I think that's
highly possible," he says. "We will probably need a major concentration of
forces in the Middle East over a long period of time. That will come at a
price, but think of the price of not having it. When we have economic
problems, it's been caused by disruptions in our oil supply. If we have a
force in Iraq, there will be no disruption in oil supplies."
Costly global commitment
Rumsfeld and Kagan
believe that a successful war against Iraq will produce other benefits,
such as serving an object lesson for nations such as Iran and Syria.
Rumsfeld, as befits his sensitive position, puts it rather gently. If a
regime change were to take place in Iraq, other nations pursuing weapons
of mass destruction "would get the message that having them . . . is
attracting attention that is not favorable and is not helpful," he says.
Kagan is more blunt.
"People worry a lot
about how the Arab street is going to react," he notes. "Well, I see that
the Arab street has gotten very, very quiet since we started blowing
things up."
The cost of such a
global commitment would be enormous. In 2000, we spent $281 billion on our
military, which was more than the next 11 nations combined. By 2003, our
expenditures will have risen to $378 billion. In other words, the increase
in our defense budget from 1999-2003 will be more than the total amount
spent annually by China, our next largest competitor.
The lure of empire is
ancient and powerful, and over the millennia it has driven men to commit
terrible crimes on its behalf. But with the end of the Cold War and the
disappearance of the Soviet Union, a global empire was essentially laid at
the feet of the United States. To the chagrin of some, we did not seize it
at the time, in large part because the American people have never been
comfortable with themselves as a New Rome.
Now, more than a
decade later, the events of Sept. 11 have given those advocates of empire
a new opportunity to press their case with a new president. So in debating
whether to invade Iraq, we are really debating the role that the United
States will play in the years and decades to come.
Are peace and
security best achieved by seeking strong alliances and international
consensus, led by the United States? Or is it necessary to take a more
unilateral approach, accepting and enhancing the global dominance that,
according to some, history has thrust upon us?
If we do decide to
seize empire, we should make that decision knowingly, as a democracy. The
price of maintaining an empire is always high. Kagan and others argue that
the price of rejecting it would be higher still.
That's what this is
about.
"Rebuilding America's
Defenses," a 2000 report by the Project for the New American Century,
listed 27 people as having attended meetings or contributed papers in
preparation of the report. Among them are six who have since assumed key
defense and foreign policy positions in the Bush administration. And the
report seems to have become a blueprint for Bush's foreign and defense
policy.
Paul Wolfowitz
Political science
doctorate from University of
Chicago and dean of the
international relations program at
Johns
Hopkins University during the 1990s.
Served in the Reagan State Department, moved to the Pentagon during the
first Bush administration as undersecretary of defense for policy. Sworn
in as deputy defense secretary in March 2001.
John Bolton
Yale Law grad who
worked in the Reagan administration as an assistant attorney general.
Switched to the State Department in the first Bush administration as
assistant secretary for international organization affairs. Sworn in as
undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, May
2001.
Eliot Cohen
Harvard doctorate in
government who taught at Harvard and at the Naval
War College. Now directs strategic
studies at Johns Hopkins and is the author of several books on military
strategy. Was on the Defense Department's policy planning staff in the
first Bush administration and is now on Donald Rumsfeld's Defense Policy
Board.
I. Lewis Libby
Law degree from
Columbia (Yale undergrad). Held advisory positions in the Reagan State
Department. Was a partner in a Washington law firm in the late '80s before
becoming deputy undersecretary of defense for policy in the first Bush
administration (under Dick Cheney). Now is the vice president's chief of
staff.
Dov Zakheim
Doctorate in
economics and politics from Oxford University. Worked on policy issues in
the Reagan Defense Department and went into private defense consulting
during the 1990s. Was foreign policy adviser to the 2000 Bush campaign.
Sworn in as undersecretary of defense (comptroller) and chief financial
officer for the Pentagon, May 2001.
Stephen Cambone
Political science
doctorate from Claremont Graduate School. Was in charge of strategic
defense policy at the Defense Department in the first Bush administration.
Now heads the Office of Program, Analysis and Evaluation at the Defense
Department.
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