The
2004 Elections
''Bush and Kerry: Contrasting Styles
with the Same Results''
By Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
Oct 1, 2004
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Decisional style is the bridge between
individual psychology and the power struggle of interests. Although most
of politics, particularly at the geostrategic level, can be explained
without resort to individual psychology -- interests endure and
individuals come and go -- executives who must mediate and resolve
conflicts among powerful interests can affect outcomes decisively. What
difference does the contrast between Bush's and Kerry's leadership styles
make for American geostrategic behavior?
An effective executive decisional style combines characteristics of the
styles attributed to Bush and Kerry in a happy medium. The strong rational
leader melds a general and realistic vision of national interest with an
informed understanding of the policies that are meant to implement it, and
joins a firmness of will in executing policy with a willingness to adapt
policy to adverse and beneficial outcomes. The executive who is
unconcerned with policy and impervious to its effects will end up in
thrall to whomever has his ear or continue to pursue the line of failure.
The executive who has no stable vision and lacks resolve will agonize over
decisions and make ad hoc adjustments to adverse contingencies. The
apparent contrast between Bush's and Kerry's decisional styles turns out
to be less marked than it seems; either half of the model executive leads
to the same result of being at the mercy of contingencies and being forced
to back and fill, or to lash out spasmodically.
-
Bush
The consequences of Bush's decisional style in the sphere of geostrategic
behavior are on record in the failures of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the
decisive application of the vision of his administration's National
Security Strategy. Assuming a decade-long window of opportunity for the
United States to become the protector of a worldwide system of market
democracies, that strategy involved securing regime change in "rogue
states," whether peacefully or through preemptive warfare. Iraq was the
test case of the regime change policy and it has been a failure because
the assumption that Iraqis would welcome American occupation proved
unfounded.
Since Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime was toppled in 2003,
administration policy toward Iraq has proceeded along the lines of backing
and filling -- surrender of important cities in the Sunni Triangle (Fallujah
and Ramadi) to the insurgency against the occupation, compromise with
Moqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army, rushing in a governing authority composed
mostly of unpopular exile politicians led by Iyad Allawi, and currently
insisting that elections for an Iraqi government be held in January of
2005, despite the insurgency -- a position that might well be abandoned in
another ad hoc retreat.
Throughout the series of tactical retreats, Bush has doggedly stuck to his
vision of a democratic Iraq and has continually discounted adverse
contingencies, insisting that he will "stay the course," even as he has
countenanced one concession after the other of his initial war aims and
the successive policies meant to implement them. The result has been a
loss of American power and credibility in the world, providing the
opportunity for regional and world powers such as
Iran, North Korea, the Franco-German
combine, Russia and China to assert their own interests more successfully
against those of the United States. American military power has had its
limitations revealed and the vision of the National Security Strategy is,
for the present, not actionable.
The failures of Operation Iraqi Freedom have not merely thrown the
National Security Strategy into doubt; they have also diminished the
influence of the neo-conservative advisers who formulated it. At the
present time, the administration lacks a coherent strategic doctrine and
there is no current contender for that role. Unless a new strategy is
formulated, a second Bush administration would be more prey to making ad
hoc adjustments to adversity, retrenching as a rule, but also tempted to
abrupt and excessive action if placed under sufficient pressure.
Under the imperative to rebuild American power or retreat further, Bush
will be faced with conflicts between factions within his security team and
will lack the confidence provided by even an unrealistic vision. The way
will be open to decisional paralysis at the extreme and at least half
measures in different directions punctuated by confrontational outbursts.
Geostrategy in a second Bush administration is a question mark. Its
daunting challenge will be to secure stability in Iraq -- requiring a
continued military commitment -- as it rebuilds American power and
responds to initiatives from contending powers. If it was unable to
achieve those aims, the consequence would be further loss of American
power in the world. Bush's leadership style does not portend success in
the project of recovery.
Kerry
Were Kerry to capture the presidency, he would bring to the office a
decisional style that appears to be the opposite of his rival's. Based on
the many reports gathered from interviews with the candidate and his
current and former political associates, Kerry focuses mainly on the
possible consequences of alternative policies, seeking to gather
information on issues from a variety of sources, playing devil's advocate
and taking multiple perspectives on the meaning of the information he
receives, and concentrating on worst-case scenarios and trying to
anticipate the responses to his initiatives by allies and opponents.
Whereas Bush is interested in his vision, Kerry is concerned with
applications. Whereas Bush restricts his sources of information, Kerry
expands them. Whereas Bush adheres to an ideology, Kerry is pragmatic and
accepts established parameters. Whereas Bush is optimistic, Kerry is
skeptical.
The terms used to characterize Kerry's decisional style in press reports
are "perfectionist," "prosecutorial," "painstaking," "deliberate,"
"diligent," and "pragmatic." Each member of this cluster of kindred terms
points to a disposition to caution. As a senator, Kerry has been more a
follower than a leader, with few major legislative initiatives to his
credit. He is most comfortable if all the bases are covered before he
makes a move, which causes him to delay making decisions until he has
convinced himself that he grasps the safest course of achieving his
objectives, whatever they have become in the deliberative process, which
can lead to altering aims, if not broad principles.
Kerry's decisional style is most of all prudent. His concern to anticipate
adverse consequences does not result in decisional paralysis, but in
hesitation, which he has been able to overcome at critical junctures.
Nonetheless, his political associates report downsides to his difficulty
in gaining closure. He has reportedly held protracted strategy sessions
with his campaign advisers, reached decisions and then altered those
decisions when someone else got his ear after the meetings had ended.
Kerry sometimes gets buried in details as he attempts to anticipate every
possible contingency. When he expresses a position, he often qualifies it
with caveats.
The Republican charge that he is a "flip-flopper" does not get at Kerry's
weakness -- he is not at the mercy of the winds of doctrine and is not an
expedient chameleon: he works within established institutional parameters
and a received centrist ideology, normally proceeding with caution and
sometimes striking out when he feels pushed into a corner. The problem is
that he is often motivated by anxiety and ultimately lacks confidence in
his own judgment, despite his earnest efforts to cultivate it.
A telling insight into Kerry's decisional style has been provided by his
former political director Chris Gregory, who told Chicago Tribune reporter
Jill Zuckman that Kerry's proclivity to keep questioning and debating with
others and within himself comes out most markedly when he is anxious: "If
he's anxious about something, he'll ask and ask and ask and ask." As is
indicated by the consensus of his political associates, Kerry is
frequently anxious.
Kerry's decisional style has not been tested in an executive capacity, but
it is possible to project how it would be likely to affect his
geostrategic decisions if he assumed the presidency. Confronted with
repairing the damage done by Operation Iraqi Freedom to American power,
Kerry would be faced with making critical and complex decisions that would
tax his limited ability to remain calm and confident. He would be prey to
resorting to his defense mechanism of hesitation and might be unable in
some cases to make a clear choice, not because he was ill-informed, but
because the complexity would be too great and the stakes too high for him
to be able to achieve closure. The result would be exactly the same as it
is for Bush's contrasting decisional style -- stop-gap and ad hoc
measures, normally spelling retreat and sometimes lashing back.
Conclusion
If anxiety is at the root of Kerry's incomplete decisional style, it is
the same for Bush. One way of coping with lack of trust in one's own
judgment is to immerse oneself in details in a fruitless attempt to
anticipate all contingencies, and another is to ignore the contingencies
altogether and dwell within the big picture that one has constructed
within one's imagination. In both cases, the decisions that must be taken
under the pressure of events will lack clarity of purpose and strength of
resolve -- they will be reactive rather than proactive. In Bush's case,
reactivity is the result of the failure of visionary proactivity and the
absence of any strategic replacement for it. In Kerry's case, reactivity
is his habitual mode of adaptation to stress, which would be unlikely to
change if he became president. AxisofLogic
Neither
Bush's nor Kerry's decisional style is optimal for meeting the challenges
to American interests that are growing in the world.
Regional and world powers with interests
that conflict with the United States will sense the drift in American
geostrategy and will seek to exploit American vulnerability. After the
presidential elections, a period is likely to open in which competing
powers will test American resolve. In pursuing their interests, their
challenge will be to push against the United States, but not so intensely
that they provoke a spasmodic backlash.
Bulatlat
Past Alternative Readers
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