Bu-lat-lat (boo-lat-lat) verb: to search, probe, investigate, inquire; to unearth facts Volume 3, Number 28 August 17 - 23, 2003 Quezon City, Philippines |
Ex-AFP
Psy-Ops Chief says GMA Can’t Reform Military Just
as lack of professionalism and corruption continues to fester the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), hundreds and perhaps thousands of idealistic and
reform-minded officers and men enlist for any signs of agitation for mutinous
and other rebellious activities. A number of them, however, just leave without
whimper and relocate themselves for what they believe are more fruitful
endeavors. One of these young officers, Army Capt. Rene N. Jarque, who quietly
left the service in 1998 likens the AFP to a “crumbling, old house” and says
that President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be expected to reform the military
for several reasons. By
Alexander Martin Remollino
Macapagal-Arroyo
has denied insinuations that military reform was not part of her agenda as
president saying that reforms were underway even before the mutineers struck on
July 27. But
Jarque, son of Army Gen. Raymundo Jarque who defected to the National Democratic
Front (NDF) in 1995, said AFP reform “disappeared from the President’s radar
screen as she patronized the generals for two reasons: first, she needed the
help of the AFP to hold the numerous security problems in check and to maintain
a semblance of order and authority as she dealt with a rather unstable political
set-up; second, debt of gratitude for the AFP’s pivotal role in propelling her
to the presidency.” The
former Army captain who also served as special assistant to the defense
secretary in 1998 said Macapagal-Arroyo’s debt of gratitude should not deter
an open and honest investigation of the corruption in the AFP. Jarque
graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1986 and holds an MBA
from Ateneo. He took part in the 1989 coup against then President Corazon Aquino. “Festering
cancer” The
forum, organized by Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan or New Patriotic
Alliance), dealt on the lessons drawn from the mutiny staged by – according to
government sources – at least 300 officers and enlisted personnel of the AFP
on July 27. The mutineers, who are now facing investigation while being held by
their mother units, are now facing investigation by a fact-finding commission
appointed by the president as well as by both houses of Congress. Government
officials have alleged that the incident was part of a coup plot linking ousted
President Joseph Estrada and his family as well as Sen. Gregorio Honasan, who is
now in hiding. In
the same forum, former AFP Inspector General Danilo Vizmanos, described the
Oakwood incident as a mere “military demonstration.” Had the mutineers –
who reportedly numbered 2,000 – instead staged a peaceful prayer vigil at
Plaza Miranda, in full uniform and without arms, their grievances against
corruption in the AFP and call for Macapagal-Arroyo’s resignation would have
gathered public support, he said. Vizmanos,
a former Navy captain who now heads Selda, an association of former political
detainees, described military corruption as a “festering cancer” with its
roots traceable to the role of the United States and the legacy of Marcos and
the martial law years. Vizmanos
said that the U.S. development of proxy armies, such as that of Fulgencio
Batista in Cuba, during the Cold War strengthened military organizations in
different parts of the world including in the Philippines to the point of
intimidating and undermining civilian authority. During
martial law, he said, “Systematic and methodical corruption of the military
hierarchy was an essential part of Marcos’s strategy to maintain his control
of the armed forces and assure longevity of the dictatorship.” “‘Power-sharing’
was also part of the political strategy as an incentive to the
politically-ambitious military brass who hungered for state power and a share of
the loot of the people’s money,” said Vizmanos. “The shrewd and wily
Marcos certainly knew how to bloat the ego and swell the heads of top-brass
opportunists.” Referring
to the reign of terror during those years, Vizmanos said “Marcos had no qualms
in giving license to sadistic officers and men to commit human rights violations
with impunity. All those engaged in counter-insurgency conflict were given a
free hand to “salvage” and torture “subversives” and “enemies of the
state” without fear of prosecution in any court of law.” Reforming
the military Jarque,
meanwhile said that there is definitely a need for reform in the armed forces.
“The signposts of unprofessionalism and corruption are everywhere -- the
sergeant who sells combat boots and grenades, the major who gets a kickback from
purchases, the lieutenant who accepts bribes from illegal loggers, the general
who converts unit funds for personal purposes, the sergeant who hides his
incompetence through a padrino, the colonel who seeks promotion by palakasan
or sipsipan and every officer or enlisted personnel who receives an
allowance derived from an illegal practice called ‘conversion,’” he
pointed out. “Poor hospital conditions, shoddy maintenance of equipment,
inadequate housing for soldiers, unflyable planes and unsailable vessels, no
first-aid kits to field units, lack of ammunition -- all these point to
something fundamentally wrong with the state of the AFP today and the need for
reform.” He
said the Philippine Navy should be named, “Italian Navy”: “Ang mga
barko ay laging naka-tali (boats are always anchored [for being unusable]
instead of being out in the sea.” Jarque
cited types of corruption in the armed forces: commissions, kickbacks,
overpricing, padding, substitution, rigged biddings, under-delivery and ghost
delivery. These are the same forms of military corruption cited by Lt. SG
Antonio Trillanes IV, one of the leaders of the Oakwood mutiny, in a paper on
corruption in the Philippine Navy which he wrote as an MA Public Administration
student at UP in 2001. “However,”
he said, “the AFP is involved in a far more sophisticated form of corruption
that can be called the ‘mother’ of all corruption in the AFP. This is the
practice called “conversion”. It is the ultimate source of abuse and
corruption in the AFP that has caused demoralization in the ranks. What is
conversion and why is it a problem?” Lifting
from an article he wrote in the Army Journal in 1997, he defined conversion as
“the process of converting procurements into their cash equivalent.” He also
quoted from Col. Ricardo Morales, who wrote an essay on the same topic in the
same publication in 2001: “If an amount is originally intended for office
supplies but is instead spent for construction materials, this amount has to be
‘converted’ so that government accounting and auditing requirements are
satisfied.” NRP
in Oakwood Rafael
Baylosis, vice-chair for political and external affairs of the Kilusang Mayo
Uno, dismissed Honasan’s “National
Recovery Program” as no different from programs pursued by past
administrations. NRP
was used by the July 27 mutineers as their “political program.” But the
program is said to be Honasan’s campaign agenda for his presidential bid in
May 2004. Baylosis, however, did not belittle the grievances of the mutineers saying that they deserve sympathy and that they should not be confused with the reactionary politicians who used their idealism for their own ends. He commended the mutineers for their courage and sincerity that, he said, warrant the support of and coordination with progressive forces in the Philippines. With other reports / Bulatlat.com Related
article in this issue: Other
related articles: As
junior officers are barred from public hearings: Senate,
House Grill Abaya Mindanao
Truth Commission Appeals for Mutineers’ Help in Probe of Davao Bombings Siege
in Makati: Rebel Soldiers Ask President, Generals to
Resign Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo’s Strong Republic is Fast Crumbling from Within –
NDFP Quarantine for the "Coup Virus"? Navy
Whistleblowers’ Lost Cause On
Coups and the “Magdalo Group”-- Reliving History
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